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Cognitive neuroscience aims to map mental processes onto brain function, which begs
the question of what “mental processes” exist and how they relate to the tasks that are
used to manipulate and measure them. This topic has been addressed informally in prior
work, but we propose that cumulative progress in cognitive neuroscience requires a more
systematic approach to representing the mental entities that are being mapped to brain
function and the tasks used to manipulate and measure mental processes.We describe a
new open collaborative project that aims to provide a knowledge base for cognitive neu-
roscience, called the Cognitive Atlas (accessible online at http://www.cognitiveatlas.org),
and outline how this project has the potential to drive novel discoveries about both mind
and brain.
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“We’re drowning in information and starving for knowledge” –
Rutherford B. Rogers
The field of cognitive neuroscience faces an increasingly criti-
cal challenge: How can we integrate knowledge from an exploding
number of studies acrossmultiplemethodologies in order to char-
acterize how mental processes are implemented in the brain? The
creation of neuroimaging databases containing data from large
numbers of studies has provided the basis for powerful meta-
analyses (Laird et al., 2005). However, the semantic infrastruc-
ture for characterizing the psychological aspects of these studies
has lagged far behind the technical infrastructure for databasing
and analyzing the imaging results. We propose that cumulative
progress in cognitive neuroscience requires such a semantic infra-
structure, and that this problem must be addressed through the
development of knowledge bases of mental processes (Price and
Friston, 2005; Bilder et al., 2009). Here we outline a new project
called the Cognitive Atlas (CA)1 that aims to develop such a
framework through collaborative social knowledge building.
WHAT IS THE PROBLEM?
The cognitive neuroscientist wishes to answer questions such as:
“What are theneural substrates of workingmemory?”According to
1By “cognitive” we mean to refer to mental processes very broadly, which we take
to include domains such as emotion or motivation that have historically been
distinguished from cognition.
PubMed, as of February 2011 there were 2613 published research
papers that mentioned“working memory”along with either func-
tional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), positron emission
tomography (PET), EEG/ERP, or lesion analysis. Despite this sub-
stantial body of published research, it remains difficult to integrate
across this work in order to understand the concept of “work-
ing memory” and how it relates to brain function, for two major
reasons: ambiguous terminology and confounding of cognitive
processes with the tasks used to measure these.
AMBIGUOUS TERMINOLOGY
There is substantial ambiguity in the way that terms are used in
cognitive neuroscience. On the one hand, many terms are used
to denote multiple, potentially distinct processes. For example,
the term “working memory” has several distinct definitions in the
neuroscience literature:
• holding information online in memory, as used by Goldman-
Rakic (1995) and measured in non-human primates using tasks
such as the oculomotor delayed response task
• manipulating information held in memory, as used by Badde-
ley (1992) and measured in humans using tasks such as the
letter–number sequencing task
• memory for temporally varying aspects of a task (roughly equiv-
alent to the concept of episodic memory), as used by Olton et al.
(1979) and measured in rodents using a radial arm maze task
with varied food locations
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Thus, searching for “working memory” may retrieve papers that
are relevant to a range of different specific psychological processes.
On the other hand, many processes are described in the literature
using several different terms. For example, the first sense of “work-
ing memory” listed above is often described using other terms
including “short-term memory” or “active maintenance.” For this
reason, searches that only include “working memory” will fail to
retrieve papers that use those other terms unless the search is
expanded to include those other terms, whereas query expansions
that do include those other terms may yield unacceptably high
numbers of irrelevant documents.
TASKS VERSUS CONSTRUCTS
There is a longstanding tendencywithin the cognitiveneuroscience
literature to equate tasks with mental constructs. For example,
the “Sternberg item recognition task” is often referred to as the
“Sternberg working memory task,” which implies that it measures
a specific mental construct (“working memory”). This conflation
of tasks and constructs causes a number of difficulties. First, the
measurement of a psychological construct requires a comparison
between specific task conditions (Sternberg, 1969); thus, whereas
the contrast of particular conditions within the Sternberg task
(e.g., high load versus low load) may indeed be associated with the
construct of workingmemory, other contrastsmay not (e.g., probe
match versus probe mismatch). Second, any link between tasks
and constructs reflects a particular theory about how the task is
performed; thus, equating tasks with constructs makes theoretical
assumptions that may not be shared throughout the community
(and further, those community assumptions may be incorrect).
For example, the color–word Stroop task is sometimes referred to
as an “inhibition task” (Donohoe et al., 2006). However, the role
of an active inhibitory process in producing the Stroop effect has
been questioned by a number of investigators (Cohen et al., 1990).
Similarly, while the N -back task is often referred to as the“N -back
working memory task,” serious questions have been raised regard-
ing whether it truly measures the construct of “working memory”
(Kane et al., 2007). The equation of tasks and processes thus pro-
duces substantial confusion about what is actually being measured
by cognitive neuroscience studies.
One problem that arises from this is that a single task is often
associated with multiple constructs in the literature. As an exam-
ple, Sabb et al. (2008) used literature mining tools to examine the
published literature related to the construct of “cognitive control.”
They found that this construct was associated with a number of
other constructs (including “working memory,”“response inhibi-
tion,”“response selection,”and“task/set switching”), and that there
were no tasks that were uniquely associated with the construct of
“cognitive control” in the literature; each task was also associated
with at least one of those other constructs. Further, the association
in the literature between these tasks and constructs changed over
time. This lack of consistency in the way that tasks and concepts
are treated in the literature makes it difficult to draw meaningful
inferences from existing literature and limits the cumulative value
of the knowledge represented in this literature.
TOWARD AN ONTOLOGY FOR COGNITION
What is urgently needed is an informatics resource that can solve
the problems listed above. Such a resource would provide the
ability to identify the particular usage of terms, to allow brows-
ing for related concepts, and to allow the identification of relevant
evidence from the literature that is related to these concepts. This
would allow intelligent aggregation of research findings, which
could help overcome the information overload that currently
afflicts researchers. We propose that this challenge can be best
addressed through the development and widespread implemen-
tation of an ontology for cognitive neuroscience. In philosophy,
“ontology” refers to the study of existence or being. However, in
bioinformatics the term is increasingly used in the sense defined
by Gruber (1993) as an “explicit specification of a conceptual-
ization,” or a structured knowledge base meant to support the
sharing of knowledge as well as automated reasoning about that
knowledge. Ontologies have also provided the basis for effec-
tive knowledge accumulation in molecular biology and genomics
(Bard and Rhee, 2004). One of the best known examples is the
Gene Ontology2 (GO; Ashburner et al., 2000). This ontology pro-
vides consistent descriptors for gene products, including cellular
components (e.g., “ribosome”), biological processes (e.g., “signal
transduction”), and molecular functions (e.g.,“catalytic activity”).
GO provides the basis on which to annotate datasets regarding
their function, which prevents the common problem of different
researchers using different names to describe the same biological
structure or process across different organisms. It also provides
the ability to traverse the ontology in order to discover larger-scale
regularities by expanding the search to include the subordinate
terms in the ontology. There are increasingly powerful tools that
are built around ontologies such as GO; given a dataset (such as
a gene expression pattern), these tools provide a broad range of
functions such as the comparison of genetic datasets based on
the similarity of their GO annotation patterns (Ruths et al., 2009)
and the extraction of novel biological facts from the text of arti-
cles (Müller et al., 2004). Ontologies have also been developed
in a number of other domains in neuroscience (Martone et al.,
2004); most relevant to cognitive neuroscience, there are well-
developed ontologies of brain structure (Bowden and Dubach,
2003).
A large body of research in cognitive science has developed
detailed domain-specific theories of mental processes, but there
has been very little work to systematically characterize how these
processes are defined and how they fit together into a larger
structure. In part this likely reflects the functionalist character
of modern psychology, which arose in reaction to the struc-
turalist approach of the nineteenth century (e.g., as seen in the
so-called “faculty psychology” that was employed by phrenolo-
gists; Boring, 1950). There have been some attempts at larger-
scale “unified theories of cognition” such as Anderson’s ACT-R
(Anderson et al., 2004) and Newell’s SOAR (Laird et al., 1987),
but these approaches have primarily focused on the develop-
ment of general unifying computational principles rather than
on a systematic characterization of the broad range of cognitive
processes.
Other extant vocabularies, such as the medical subject headings
(MeSH), contain some content relevant to cognitive neuroscience,
but suffer from serious limitations. For example, the MeSH
2http://www.geneontology.org
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hierarchy for “Cognition” includes just the following concepts:
Awareness, Cognitive Dissonance, Comprehension, Conscious-
ness, Imagination, and Intuition. These terms possess no mean-
ingful relation to the current conceptual framework of cognitive
science. In addition, the MeSH terms are a mixture of mental
processes (e.g.,“comprehension”), experimental phenomena (e.g.,
“illusions”), and experimental procedures (e.g., “maze learning”),
along with outdated terms such as“neurolinguistic programming”
(which is best characterized as a pseudoscience). Given that MeSH
is the lexicon used for indexing articles and expanding queries
in PubMed, this suggests that searches of this literature could be
greatly improved through the use of vocabularies that better reflect
current thinking.
The development of formal ontologies of cognition faces a dis-
tinct challenge in comparison to other domains in biology, such as
neuroanatomy or cellular function: There is precious little consen-
sus across the field regarding the basic units of mental function.
Given that a formal ontology is generally meant to express the
shared ontological commitments of a group, this poses a difficult
challenge to the development of an ontology of mental processes.
There are two alternatives in this case. The first would be to
forge ahead and develop a single ontology based on the consen-
sus obtained within a small group of individuals. This would have
the benefit of providing an ontology approved by consensus of its
architects, but it would be useless to anyone who did not share
the group’s ontological commitments. An alternative approach,
which we adhere to in the present work, is to allow and cap-
ture disagreement, in order to represent the range of views that
are present in the field. Our approach to this issue is inspired
by the success of social collaborative knowledge building projects
such as Wikipedia, which allow discussion and the expression of
divergent views in service of developing a broader consensus, and
one that can be modified flexibly over time as new knowledge
emerges.
THE COGNITIVE ATLAS
To address the need for a formal knowledge base that cap-
tures the broad range of conceptual structure within cogni-
tive science, we have developed the CA (accessible online at
http://www.cognitiveatlas.org). The system is under continuous
development, and new features will be added in the future, but
the current system provides the basic functionality for specifica-
tion of knowledge about cognitive processes and tasks. The system
has been designed with the intention of making interaction with
the knowledge base as easy as possible, without requiring users
to possess expertise in ontologies or knowledge base development
(Miller et al., 2010). In addition, the system uses standard mech-
anisms to enable programmatic access to the database (such as
SPARQL Protocol and RDF Query Language, SPARQL), which
allows other sites or databases to use the content in an automated
manner.
An important guiding principle in the design of the CA has
been the distinction between mental tasks and mental processes.
Mental processes are not directly accessible, but psychological
tasks can be used to manipulate and measure them, and behav-
ior or brain activity observed during those tasks is interpreted as
reflecting those latent mental constructs. The ontological status of
psychological tasks is not in question (i.e., nearly everyone will
agree on what the “Stroop task” is), but the relation of those tasks
to the latent mental constructs is at the center of many debates in
cognitive science. For this reason, we propose that it is essential
to make a clear distinction between mental processes and psy-
chological tasks, and to develop separate ontologies for those two
domains (resulting in two separate but interlinked ontologies that
form a bipartite graph).
STRUCTURE OF THE KNOWLEDGE BASE
Development of the schemas for the CA knowledge base required
an analysis of the kinds of knowledge structures that are used in
cognitive science. An initial vocabulary of more than 800 terms
was identified manually through analysis of a broad set of publi-
cations on cognitive psychology and cognitive neuroscience and
curated by three of the authors (Russell A. Poldrack, Robert M.
Bilder, Fred W. Sabb). These entitles were classified into two broad
classes: mental concepts and mental tasks.
MENTAL CONCEPTS
A mental concept is a latent unobservable construct postulated by
a psychological theory. Although these mental concepts are ulti-
mately instantiated in brain tissue, the mental concept entity in the
knowledge base refers to the latent construct (e.g., at Marr’s com-
putational or algorithmic levels) rather than its physical instan-
tiation. Some potential kinds of mental concepts include (but
are not limited to) mental representations and mental processes.
Mental representations are mental entities that stand in relation
to some physical entity (e.g., a mental image of a visual scene
stands in relation to, or is isomorphic with, some arrangement of
objects in the physical world) or abstract concept (which could
be another mental entity). Mental processes are entitles that trans-
form or operate on mental representations (e.g., a process that
searches a mental representation of the visual scene for a partic-
ular object). In order to accommodate the widest possible range
of theories of cognition (including non-representational theories
such as Edelman, 1989), the knowledge base does not require that
mental concepts be specified into these subclasses, and indeed it
is agnostic about this distinction, permitting but not demand-
ing that cognitive “representations” exist. Mental concepts in the
CA knowledge base are modeled using the Concept class from
the simple knowledge organization system (SKOS; Bechhofer and
Miles, 2009), which describes the basic structure of conceptual
entities. An overview of the database schema for mental concepts
is presented in Figure 1.
MENTAL TASKS
A mental task is a prescribed activity meant to engage or manipu-
late mental function in an effort to gain insight into the underlying
mental processes. The structure of the representation of mental
tasks in the CA builds upon the cognitive paradigm ontology
(CogPO3; Turner and Laird, 2011), which has a basic class of
Behavioral Experimental Paradigm that describes mental tasks.
An overview of the database schema for mental tasks is presented
in Figure 2.
3www.cogpo.org
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FIGURE 1 | An overview of the database schema for representation of mental concepts in the Cognitive Atlas. Blue boxes reflect external ontologies,
and dashed lines reflect class inheritance, while solid lines reflect ontological relations.
Tasks often evoke overt responses (such as motor actions), but
this is not necessary; e.g., a brain imaging study could measure
the neural responses evoked by a particular form of stimulation
(such as watching a movie) without any overt behavior. Any par-
ticular task has a number of different features that need to be
distinguished and/or measured.
Experimental conditions
Experimental conditions are the subsets of an experiment that
define the relevant experimental manipulation. For example, in
the color–word Stroop task there are generally three conditions
(congruent, incongruent, and neutral trials). This could also be
extended to include parametric manipulations as well. These
are defined according to the Behavioral Experimental Paradigm
Condition class in CogPO.
Indicators
An indicator is a specific quantitative or qualitative variable that
is recorded for analysis. These may include behavioral variables
(such as response time, accuracy, or other measures of per-
formance) or physiological variables (including genetics, psy-
chophysiology, lesion effects,or neuroimagingdata). In the current
implementation of the CA, we focus primarily on behavioral
indicators, but we intend the system to be generally applica-
ble to any indicators measured in the context of mental func-
tion, including physiologicalmeasurements, genetics, and imaging
data.
Contrasts
Although absolute measures of behavior may occasionally be
meaningful (e.g., scores on a standardized test), it is usually the
comparison of indicators across different experimental conditions
that we associate with particular mental processes, through sub-
traction logic or other experimental designs. In the CA, we define
a contrast as any function over experimental conditions (borrow-
ing this usage from the notion of linear contrasts in the general
linear model, as commonly used in the neuroimaging literature).
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FIGURE 2 | An overview of the database schema for representation of
mental tasks in the Cognitive Atlas. Blue boxes reflect external ontologies,
and dashed lines reflect class inheritance, while solid lines reflect ontological
relations. The dashed line connecting activation maps to imaging databases is
meant to reflect an empirical relation, as these databases do not currently
expose formal ontologies.
The simplest contrast is the indicator value for a specific con-
dition; In some cases this will be meaningful in absolute terms,
whereas in other cases (e.g., with neuroimaging data) this would
reflect a comparison with a more basic baseline condition, such as
rest or visual fixation. More complex contrasts include linear or
non-linear functions of the indicator across different experimental
conditions. For example, in the Stroop task, there would be simple
contrasts for each of the three conditions, in addition to contrasts
such as (incongruent–congruent) and (incongruent–neutral) that
index the well-known “Stroop effect.” These are defined accord-
ing to the Behavioral Experimental Paradigm Contrast class in
CogPO.
RELATIONS
While a well-defined vocabulary is critical to our knowledge base,
it is the relations between the terms within the vocabulary that are
of greatest interest, because they express the theoretical claims
of cognitive theories. The CA includes a number of different
types of relations (though not all have been implemented in the
current release). Where ever possible, we have reused existing
ontologies.
BASIC ONTOLOGICAL RELATIONS
A standard set of ontological relations has been codified into the
open biomedical ontologies (OBO) Relational Ontology (Smith
et al., 2005), which provides guidelines regarding the consistent
use of specific ontological relations across different ontologies. We
have adopted several of the basic ontological relations from this
ontology:
• is-a (e.g., “declarative memory is a kind of memory”)
• part-of (e.g., “memory retrieval is a part of declarative mem-
ory”)
• transformation-of (e.g., “consolidated memory is a transforma-
tion of encoded memory”)
• preceded-by (e.g., “memory consolidation is preceded by mem-
ory encoding”)
Wehave excluded a set of spatial relations defined in theOBORela-
tionalOntology, because they only apply to entities that have a spa-
tial location. We have also excluded a set of participation relations
(has_participant, has_agent); these operators express relations
between processes and continuants (things), and in the context
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of latent mental entities it is not yet clear how to conceptualize
those constructs.
RELATIONS BETWEEN PROCESSES AND TASKS
In addition to the basic relations from the OBO Relational Ontol-
ogy, we also define a measured by relation, which denotes the
relation between a cognitive process and a particular contrast
on a task [e.g., “conflict processing is measured by the contrast
of (incongruent–congruent) in the Stroop task”]. This is meant
to reflect the primary form of theoretical claim made by cogni-
tive psychologists, namely that some particular task manipulation
affects a particular mental process.
RELATIONS AMONG TASKS
A second new relation introduced in CA is the descended-from
relation, which represents historical and/or conceptual relations
between tasks. It is clear that within a broad class of tasks (e.g.,
“Color–Word Stroop task”), there will be a large number of poten-
tial variations that could have functional implications, and these
develop over time. In order to capture these relationships, we use
the concept of “task phylogeny” (Bilder et al., 2009), which treats
tasks according to a family tree in which tasks inherit particu-
lar features from earlier tasks. Thus, the descended-from relation
reflects something like a biological inheritance relationship. In
this case, “speciation” is determined by whether the resulting
data are commensurate for meta-analysis. If they are not, then
one task would be considered as derived from another, rather
than being considered slightly different variants of the same
task.
LITERATURE RELATIONS
All of the entities in the CA knowledge base (including concepts,
tasks, and relations) can be associated with literature citations,
using a built-in interface to the PubMed literature database. The
knowledge base also allows annotation of relations to specific cita-
tions, using the relations defined in the citation typing ontology
(CiTO; Shotton, 2010). This ontology supports annotation that
specifies whether particular citations support or refute a partic-
ular claim, as well as many other aspects of citation. Currently,
we have only implemented a single literature relation, which is
equivalent to the CITO “citesForInformation” relation.
RELATIONS TO OBSERVED DATA
The CA does not directly store data; instead, in order to support
the annotation of relations between tasks and observed data, the
system provides the ability to relate specific task contrasts to enti-
ties or data that are stored in external databases. These will include
brain regions (as represented in databases of brain structure such
as the Foundational Model of Anatomy or Brainmap), genes and
genetic variants (as represented in dbSNP and EntrezGene), and
cellular functions (as represented in GO).
TECHNICAL INFRASTRUCTURE
The CA knowledge base is stored natively in a custom MySQL rela-
tional database.We chose to do this, rather than storing the knowl-
edge natively in an ontology language or resource description
format (RDF) triplestore, in order to maximize the flexibility with
which the knowledge can be stored. Instead, we have developed
a pipeline to generate an Web Ontology Language (OWL) ontol-
ogy from the database; this allows us to expose the ontological
knowledge in a standard format, while still retaining flexibility to
store information that may not be easily represented in a formal
ontology language. The OWL representation of the CA is available
via the NCBO BioPortal4 and the Python code used to generate
the OWL representation from the database dumps is available at
https://github.com/poldrack/cogat.
In order to maximize the ability to interact directly and auto-
matically with other projects, theCAproject is built around a set of
SemanticWeb (Berners-Lee et al., 2001) technologies (Miller et al.,
2010). First, the representation of every concept in the knowledge
base is available in RDF, which is a format for representing seman-
tic resources in a machine-understandable way. Second, the CA
site exposes a web service known as a SPARQL endpoint, which
allows direct queries of the knowledge base by humans or other
computer systems and returns results from the knowledge base
in a standards-based format that preserves conceptual relation-
ships and valuable contextual information. Together, these services
provide other projects with the ability to directly and effectively
access the current state of the knowledge base. This allows sub-
stantially greater interoperability between systems representing
different kinds of information, and supports the automation of
such interactions based on common standards for interoperability
and knowledge sharing.
In addition to the specific benefits for cognitive neuroscience,
the infrastructure developed as part of the CA should also serve as
a building block for other projects that aim to build collaborative
knowledge bases. Given that the informatics community is still
converging on standards for interoperability between projects, we
hope that our demonstration of the effectiveness of Semantic Web
technologies will provide further impetus for their use in such
projects.
The web based interface utilizes HTML 5, CSS 3, and cus-
tom JavaScript to generate interactive features. It relies on the
jQuery libraries and a large number of jQuery utility plugins. The
server side software uses a standard LAMP stack (Linux, Apache,
MySQL, and PHP). Graphviz is used for generating RDF visual-
izations, and Arc2/Semsol for RDF parsing and SPARQL libraries.
The front end and back end communicate with AJAX techniques,
passing JSON objects from the end-user page to the server and
back, as well as with standard POST and GET requests. PDF sup-
port is provided by the wkhtmltopdf libraries. Infamous powers
the RSS bubble visualizations with Feedburner generating the RSS
feed, while PubBrain powers the fMRI imaging references. The
PubMedEntrezAPI is used for bibliographic citations and abstract
lookups.
BENEFITS AND CHALLENGES OF COLLABORATIVE
KNOWLEDGE BUILDING
The Internet has made it possible to tap into the knowledge of
people across the globe on an unprecedented scale. Hundreds of
thousands of people have worked together to write the software
4http://bioportal.bioontology.org/
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that runs the Internet, write the largest encyclopedia in human
history5, discover new stars and galaxies, and achieve many other
goals that would be impossible through either humans or com-
puters working alone. Such systems serve as both existence proofs
and design models for collaborative knowledge building in sci-
ence. For example, thousands of individuals may contribute to a
single Wikipedia article, each with different knowledge and points
of view, with results rivaling those of expert-written encyclope-
dias in quality (Giles, 2005) and vastly exceeding them in scope.
However, the process through which such high-quality collabora-
tive knowledge building happens is by no means a given, requiring
the evolution of community norms, explicit rules, technological
features, and significant effort spent on coordination and conflict
resolution (Kittur and Kraut, 2008). Our goal in the CA project is
to leverage the emerging understanding of crowd-driven collabo-
rative knowledge building to develop a system for scientists that
captures a wide variety of viewpoints and builds consensus across
fields.
CAPTURING AND RESOLVING DISAGREEMENT
Though seemingly simple at first glance, Wikipedia is a sophis-
ticated engine for collaborative knowledge building with highly
developed mechanisms for lowering participation costs, promot-
ing collaboration, updating information, resolving conflict, and
consolidating content. Over a third of all work in Wikipedia goes
not to editing articles but instead to coordination activities such
as debate about policies and procedures, maintenance activities
such as deleting non-conforming pages, and negotiation about
content and issues (Kittur et al., 2007). The very large and increas-
ing amount of effort being spent on coordination emphasizes the
need for a collaborative knowledge creation system to focus on
supporting collaboration at least as much as supporting knowl-
edge creation. Wikipedia supports collaboration through a wide
variety of mechanisms. One of the simplest but most important is
the presence of a “discussion” section on every page, which con-
tains a record of all current and past conversations regarding a
page separate from the content of the page itself. New users can
view past discussions in order to take advantage of the information
accrued in past conversations and avoid repeating past mistakes.
The CA adds to this functionality to deal with relations, capturing
discussion not only for concepts but also for relations between
them. Furthermore, discussions are integrated directly into con-
cept and relation pages, surfacing them and making them salient
to readers as well as contributors. When discussion alone can-
not resolve disagreement, concepts can be “forked” or merged as
discussed further below.
CURATION
Although completely open systems such as Wikipedia work well
for general encyclopedic knowledge, some of the greatest successes
in scientific knowledge building have come from curated models
such as GO. The CA aims to strike a balance between the two
extremes, with curation done on an as-needed basis by the core
team and volunteer curators. However, curation will not be done
5Wikipedia.org
in a vacuum; viewpoints and discussion from the community will
be elicited for curation decisions, and decisions are expected to
reflect the consensus of the community.At the same time,a guiding
principle is that curatorial decisions should be“evidence-based”to
ensure that questions about terminology, concepts, and relation-
ships are not determined only by popular fiat. As the Atlas grows,
it will likely need to develop more sophisticated procedures for
dealing with curation (as have been developed in Wikipedia: Forte
et al., 2009), which will be developed in collaboration with and by
the scientific user community.
UTILITY OF THE COGNITIVE ATLAS
The CA will provide a formalization of what are often implicit
conceptual schemes in cognitive neuroscience, and in particular
will make clear the mapping of particular task contrasts onto par-
ticular mental processes. We envision a number of ways in which
the CA could impact cognitive neuroscience research.
CLEARER VOCABULARY
The controlled vocabulary of theCAprovides away for researchers
to use terms in a more precise way, and to help reduce polysemy,
wherein the same term is used by different researchers to mean
different things. This occurs surprisingly often within the neu-
roscience literature. An example is the term “working memory,”
which has several distinct meanings in the literature, as discussed
above. This can lead to complications in automated processing of
the literature, since it is not possible to know which of these senses
is implied in any particular usage.
In the CA, each term begins with a single concept definition.
Researchers who do not agree with this definition can discuss their
disagreement using the built-in discussion feature, similar to the
way that conflicts are resolved inWikipedia.However, if it becomes
clear from the discussion that there is an irreconcilable conceptual
difference, the concept can be “forked,” in which case the original
concept is broken into a number of senses, each of which would
have its own separate concept page and participate separately in
relations with tasks. For example, in the working memory exam-
ple, the original concept “working memory”would be broken into
separate senses, such as“working memory (maintenance),”“work-
ing memory (manipulation),” and“working memory (temporal),”
with the original page being converted to a disambiguation page
for the different senses. An example of such a page for the concept
of “behavioral inhibition” is shown in Figure 3
Conversely, it is also common that different terms are used to
describe the same underlying processes. For example, the terms
“declarative memory” and “explicit memory” are often used to
refer to the same mental function. Within the CA, it is possible
to specify terms as synonyms, such that subsequent analyses using
the knowledge base will recognize the terms as synonyms. This
is preferred to the merging of the concepts into a single concept,
because it retains the original terms in the knowledge base while
still noting them as referring to the same process.
IMPROVED QUERY EXPANSION
The precision and recall of literature searches can be greatly
improved by the use of ontological knowledge to guide the
expansion of search queries. For example, PubMed currently
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FIGURE 3 | A screenshot of the disambiguation page for the concept of “behavioral inhibition,” which points to two separate senses of the term.
expands queries using the MeSH lexicon, which (as discussed
above) is not reflective of the state of the art. For example, the
query (sublexical route) is expanded by PubMed as [sublexi-
cal[All Fields] AND (“drug administration routes”[MeSH Terms]
OR (“drug”[All Fields] AND “administration”[All Fields] AND
“routes”[All Fields]) OR “drug administration routes”[All Fields]
OR “route”[All Fields])]. The confusion of MeSH regarding the
meaning of “route” in this context leads to incorrect query expan-
sion, whereas the use of a database that included “sublexical
route” as a concept would more specifically target that partic-
ular phrase. In addition, it could potentially expand the query
to include other related terms such as “phonological assembly,”
leading to search results that are more likely to find relevant
literature.
METADATA ANNOTATION AND META-ANALYSIS
The availability of large databases of neuroimaging data, particu-
larly as the Brainmap.org database (Laird et al., 2005), has enabled
powerful meta-analyses. However, the ability to perform meta-
analysis is limited by the metadata that are associated with each
data set; in order to assess which brain systems are associated
with particular mental processes, the data need to be annotated
using an ontology of mental processes. The Brainmap database
currently uses a relatively coarse ontology of mental processes,
which limits the ability to make finer assessments about structure–
function associations (Poldrack, 2006). However, the availability
of a more detailed cognitive ontology would provide the ability
to perform such mappings. As an example, Poldrack et al. (2009)
used a set of annotated task-process relations, along with latent
variables identified from fMRI data obtained across a set of eight
tasks, in order to identify which mental processes were mapped
onto brain networks. With larger data sets annotated using a more
detailed ontology, this kind of analysis could provide new insights
into which ontological distinctions in the mental process ontol-
ogy are biologically realized and which are not (Lenartowicz et al.,
2010).
THEORY TESTING
It is also possible to envision the use of meta-analysis with the
CA to test larger theories of cognitive organization. For example,
within the psychology of categorization there is a longstand-
ing debate between theories that posit single processes under-
lying both categorization and recognition memory versus sepa-
rate processes (Poldrack and Foerde, 2008). Each of these theo-
ries would make different ontological claims regarding cognitive
processes and their relations with mental tasks. These ontologi-
cal claims could potentially be translated into claims about the
covariance structure in the data obtained on those tasks, and dif-
ferent theories could be compared for their relative fit to the data
using covariance structure modeling methods. While the system
is not currently able to support such theory testing, it remains an
important goal for the future of the system.
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TRANSLATIONAL MENTAL HEALTH RESEARCH
Within psychiatry, there is an increasing movement toward the
use of dimensional rather than categorical approaches to char-
acterizing psychiatric disorders (Kraemer, 2007). Ongoing efforts
such as the NIH Research Domain Criteria project (Insel et al.,
2010) aim to characterize these underlying dimensions in terms of
their cognitive and neural bases. The social collaborative knowl-
edge building tools that are provided by the CA offer the ability
for such projects to interactively develop their knowledge base and
annotate a rich set of links between cognitive processes and data at
other levels, such as neural circuits, cellular signaling pathways, or
genes. The CA will play an essential link in allowing relationships
to be made between the neural level and the level of psychiatric
symptoms and syndromes (see Figure 4).
PRESENT STATUS AND FUTURE PLANS
The development of the CA began in 2008. In the design phase,
we analyzed the structure of the knowledge to be represented
and developed an initial schema for the database. In the initial
implementation phase, we worked with the development team
to implement the basic functionality for presenting and editing
the knowledge base (Miller et al., 2010), and also worked with
a small number of investigators to begin to populate the data-
base and refine the interaction design for the site. In the current
phase, we are continuing to implement new features as well as
refining the existing interface, with a particular focus on scaling
to larger amounts of content. We have also begun soliciting open
contributions from researchers across the field. The CA currently
has entries for 904 terms, including 708 mental constructs, and
196 tasks, with definitions present for 795 of these terms; most of
these definitions would not be viewed as sufficient by an expert in
the area, but are provided as a starting point for those experts to
edit and refine. To date the database has fewer than 900 relations
specified; whereas the first phase of the project focused on concept
definitions, a major goal in the next phase of the project will be to
enlist a wide range of researchers to contribute their knowledge of
these relations.
Beyond the addition of content, future development of the site
will focus on three areas. First, we plan to add personalization fea-
tures to allow users to keep better track of relevant information.
This will include tracking of their own contributions, tracking
of recent changes to topics of interest, and recommendation of
FIGURE 4 |The Cognitive Atlas provides a framework for relating
biological functions and processes to psychiatric symptoms and
syndromes.The links between each level in this graph reflect proposed
empirical relations; the strength of each link (noted by its width) is
proportional to the literature association between each set of terms (defined
as the Jaccard coefficient between the two search terms derived from
PubMed). Each link can also be associated with specific empirical results, as
noted in the box demonstrating a particular annotation for one of the edges.
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content and/or publications that are relevant to the user’s interests
(based on their past contributions). Second, we plan to include
content based on mining of the published literature. For exam-
ple, we might include relations in the database that are based on
association between terms in the published literature, which could
then serve as input to the manual annotation process. Third, we
plan to implement a greater degree of integration with other data-
bases. The CA lexicon already is integrated with free web services
enabling: mining of literature associations (PubAtlas6); mapping
associations of literature with a three-dimensional probabilistic
atlas of brain structure (PubBrain7); and collaborative entry of
quantitative annotations for meta-analysis of findings from cog-
nitive studies (PhenoWiki8). While the CA currently represents
the structure of tasks in a relatively coarse way, the CogPO (Turner
and Laird, 2011; see text footnote 2) project is currently developing
much more detailed task ontologies. As those become available we
will link directly to them, providing a much more thorough way
of modeling the fine-grained details of tasks. The CA lexicon will
be included in a future version of the NeuroLex database9, and we
will also implement greater integration biological ontologies such
as the GO (Ashburner et al., 2000).
Finally, it is important to be clear that the CA itself will not
contain any data, but we plan to link to empirical databases from
within the CA. In the short term, this will include direct links to
coordinate-based neuroimaging databases with exposedAPIs such
as the NeuroSynth project (Yarkoni et al., 2011) or SumsDB10,
which can provide automated access to meta-analytic empirical
6http://www.pubatlas.org
7http://www.pubbrain.org
8http://www.phenowiki.org
9http://www.neurolex.org
10http://sumsdb.wustl.edu:8081/sums/index.jsp
data linking the concepts in the database to brain systems. Cur-
rently, the NeuroSynth database includes forward and reverse
inference maps for all concept terms in the CA. In addition, if
other databases become available (e.g., genome-wide association
data, lesion mapping data, patient behavioral data, etc.) these can
also be linked directly to the database. It should also be noted that
while theCA is currently focusedon concepts from thehumanpsy-
chology literature, it will also be important to encompass concepts
from non-human animal literatures as well, in order to provide
truly systematic coverage of the literature.
CONCLUSION
The mapping of mental processes to brain systems has to date
relied largely upon informal representations of mental processes
and the tasks that are used to manipulate them. We propose
that this approach is fundamentally limited, and that continued
scientific progress in cognitive neuroscience will require the devel-
opment and adoption of formal knowledge bases that provide a
more systematic explication of cognitive theories and their rela-
tion to empirical data. The CA aims to provide such a resource
that reflects the views of the entire community, and we welcome
the contribution of interested researchers through the cognitiveat-
las.org web site. By including the contributions of researchers
across the field, we hope that the CA can become the standard
ontology for mental function.
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